Schooling quality in eastern Europe: educational production during transition by Ammermüller, A. et al.
  
 
Schooling quality in eastern Europe: educational
production during transition
Citation for published version (APA):
Ammermüller, A., Heijke, J. A. M., & Wössmann, L. (2003). Schooling quality in eastern Europe:
educational production during transition. (ROA Research Memoranda; No. 2E). Maastricht:
Researchcentrum voor Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2003
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
 
 
Schooling Quality in Eastern Europe:  
Educational Production During Transition 
 
ROA-RM-2003/2E 
 
Andreas Ammermüller 
Hans Heijke 
Ludger Wößmann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market 
 
 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
 Maastricht University 
 
 Maastricht, March 2003 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 90-5321-365-1 
Sec03.030.pdf 
 
 
i 
Abstract 
 
We estimate educational production functions for seven Eastern European transition 
countries, using student-level TIMSS data for lower secondary education. The results show 
substantial effects of student background on educational performance and a much lower 
impact of resources and the institutional setting. Two different groups of countries emerge. 
For the first group that features high mean test scores and has progressed far in transition, 
large effects of family background on student performance and a higher spread of test scores 
illustrate the similarity to Western European schooling systems, the performance of which it 
surpasses. Schools of the second group produce instead a denser distribution of educational 
achievement, characteristic of communist societies. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyzes and compares the production of schooling quality in seven Eastern 
European transition countries striving for EU accession. A main focus of the progress in the 
transition countries is on reforms of institutions and a changing structure of society. The 
supposedly egalitarian societies in which mainly the party rank defined the social position are 
replaced by a new social distinction based on occupation and income. Education is the major 
vehicle through which the societal changes take place. The function of education shifts from 
keeping the social consensus of a classless society to allocating its individual members to 
economic roles and positions, allowing for greater differentiation by increased educational 
choice (Heyneman 1997). The readiness for and speed of transition depends therefore 
essentially on reforms in education, which prepare people for their new roles in society. 
Reforms include the decentralization of the educational system, which might increase its 
effectiveness by increasing its responsiveness to market forces at the local and national level. 
A greater choice of different types of institutions for students and an increased influence of 
parents on their children’s education might as well result in higher effectiveness in the new 
economic terms (Heyneman 1997). The introduction of decentralization and free choice may 
also serve to convey the values of democracy and the market system to the population (EBRD 
2000).  
Furthermore, the market economies demand new abilities of students, like managing skills 
and high flexibility, that were not fostered under the communist regime (Berryman 2000). In 
the phase of transition, where old practices become obsolete and new opportunities arise 
quickly, allocative skills like the ability to take the appropriate decisions, which constitute an 
important effect of schooling (Schultz 1975), are rewarded greatly and affect the income 
distribution. Consistent with this reasoning, rates of return to education have been found to 
increase during the transition from communism to a market system (Newell and Reilly 1999; 
Boeri and Terrell 2002). For example, the returns to higher education more than doubled over 
the past ten years in the Czech Republic, as did their spread across occupations (Klazar et al. 
2001). The quality and variance of educational achievement may thus have an even bigger 
impact on the societal structure in transition countries than in advanced countries. When the 
Eastern European countries gain access to the EU in the coming years and the labor markets 
become integrated, they need to compete with the Western European labor force. A well-
educated work force is hence imperative for a successful integration.  
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The challenges are accompanied by new threats to the formerly high-performing education 
systems. Due to economic recessions in the early phase of transition, the level of finance for 
schools is hard to maintain. This problem relates particularly to the countries whose setbacks 
in the first years of transition were greater and who continue to struggle in their reform 
progress.  
The available resources, the institutional setting of schools and especially their usage 
depict the quality of the schooling systems. This paper examines the impact of these factors, 
as well as of student characteristics and family backgrounds, on the performance of individual 
students by estimating educational production functions for seven Eastern European countries. 
While the former factors are determined by school policy, the latter display the ability of 
schools to diminish the impact of the environment surrounding students. By estimating 
production functions of many Eastern European schooling systems for the first time, this 
paper intends to elaborate on the significance of education in the process of transition and to 
give appropriate advice for improving schooling in these countries. In addition, it contributes 
to the widely discussed topic of the effect of resources. We also compare the characteristics 
and the resulting quality of the Eastern European schooling systems to those of a sample of 
EU member countries.  
Educational production functions relate an outcome of education like educational 
achievement to various inputs. In this study, standardized test scores from the Third 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), which are comparable across 
countries, are related to variables drawn from background questionnaires on student 
background, resources employed and the institutional setting (cf. Wößmann 2003). These 
unique micro-level data on test scores and background information are available on over 
42,000 students in the 7th and 8th grade of the seven countries, who took the math and 
science tests in 1994/95. As the only measurable outcome taken into account is educational 
achievement, the analysis is restricted to the cognitive dimension of schooling. Other 
educational outcomes like civic values conveyed to students have to be neglected in the data 
analysis.  
The main finding of the paper is the straightforward distinction that can be made between 
two groups of accession countries with respect to the characteristics of the schooling systems, 
which constitute a key part of the transition process. One group has moved decisively towards 
the features of Western European countries while the other cannot display successful results 
of transition yet. The more advanced group, consisting of the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Slovenia, outperforms most EU countries and has many traits similar to the 
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Western schooling systems. The schooling systems of the less advanced group, including 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania, still feature characteristics of communist times and seem not 
yet to educate a new generation that is competitive to EU labor markets. Further findings of 
the paper are the relative importance of student background for explaining test scores, the 
ambiguous impact of resources, and the limited but existing role of the institutional setting in 
understanding within-country variations in test scores.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the seven 
transition economies and characterizes the development of their schooling systems in the 
1990s. This qualitative review facilitates an assessment of the data and results and elaborates 
on particular characteristics that are not implied in the variables. The third section describes 
the TIMS study, the data for the Eastern European countries, and the model used for the 
estimation of the production functions. The fourth section presents and discusses the results 
for the Eastern European countries. The fifth section compares them to a sample of Western 
European countries. Finally, the sixth section concludes with a summary of the findings and 
an assessment of their contribution and relevance in the context of transition economies.  
 
2. Review of the Schooling Systems in Eastern Europe 
Seven countries that belong to the group of transition countries and have started talks for EU 
accession participated in TIMSS 1995. They include the Central and Eastern European 
countries Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and the Baltic States 
Latvia and Lithuania. Table 1 presents information on the transition progress and level of 
development for each country. The figures on GDP indicate the exceptional status of 
Slovenia, featuring almost twice the Czech and Hungarian level of GDP per capita. Slovakia 
is slowly catching up to the three frontrunners. The Baltic States and Romania, the biggest 
country and laggard in recent years, belong to the lowest developed countries of the sample. 
The countries Czech Republic (CSK), Hungary (HUN), Slovakia (SLV) and Slovenia (SVN) 
will be referred to as the first group from now on. The second group comprises the remaining 
three countries Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU) and Romania (ROM).  
With the retreat of the communist ideology in Eastern Europe in 1990, quick and 
fundamental reforms of the educational systems followed. Administration of schooling was 
decentralized, leaving multiple authorities a say on education, including parents and the 
church. Additionally, national schools were established, especially in the Baltic States, to 
foster national culture and language. Moreover, the heterogeneity of schools increased, 
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changing from a system of only one basic school to more specialized institutions like the 
gymnazium or technical and vocational schools and in addition to private schools (cf. Filer 
and Münich 2000). For lower secondary education, where TIMSS took place, the choice of 
different types of schools is limited to one form in Latvia, Romania and Slovenia, two in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, four in Slovenia and five in Lithuania. Assuming a self-
selection of the more able students into more demanding types of schools with entrance 
examinations like the gymnazium, the spread of students with respect to ability might be 
greater in countries with more educational choice. However, Table 1 shows that the number 
of school types is not decisive for the spread of test scores that are displayed in Table A3, 
with Lithuania having the highest number of school types and the second lowest standard 
deviation. Policies also aimed at decentralization and more heterogeneity of the system within 
the single school types, by setting up special ability classes for both low and high performing 
students.  
With respect to the overall variation in performance, the fast implementation of reforms in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, as well as the earlier reforms in Slovenia, might have 
exerted a positive impact on the spread of scores. In Romania instead, where the latest 
educational reforms did not take place prior to 1993 and principally the communist schooling 
system still existed at the time the test was taken, the uniformity of the scheme might have 
restrained the spread of scores. As a further measure with possible influence on school quality 
and its variation, the average attendance rate in pre-primary education is higher in the first 
group of countries, where parents have to pay less and have a higher average income. The last 
year of pre-primary education is obligatory only in Hungary, Slovenia and Romania. 
  
3. Data and Regression Technique 
3.1 The TIMSS Data 
The Third International Math and Science Study (TIMSS) was conducted in 1994/95 by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Over 40 
countries worldwide participated in TIMSS, making it the largest and most complex 
achievement study ever conducted (Gonzalez and Smith 1997). This paper considers only the 
sample Population II with students from the middle school years. It comprises students from 
two adjacent grades who have the largest proportion of 13-year-old students. They correspond 
to the seventh and eighth grade in lower secondary schools in the seven countries considered 
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here. For the analysis in Eastern European countries, data for over 42,000 students from more 
than 1000 schools are available. 1 
The students took standardized achievement tests in both mathematics and science. The 
results were scaled according to an international test score with a mean of 500 and an 
international standard deviation of 100. In addition, each student, his teacher and principal 
had to complete a questionnaire giving background information on students, the community, 
resources of the school including teacher characteristics and the institutional setting. All 
available data for an individual student were merged in one database (Wößmann 2003) 
together with his sampling weight. Table A1 provides data on the participation at student, 
class and school level and the ratio of sampled students. Schools in geographically remote 
regions, extremely small schools and schools for students with special needs were excluded 
from the study, as were disabled students in regular schools. This might have led to a bias of 
the sampled students, especially when many disordered but not disabled students have been 
placed into special schools. However, all other students could be sampled and the exclusion 
rate was not to exceed 10 percent.  
As the questionnaires handed to students and teachers comprised dozens of questions, the 
problem of missing data was inevitable. In order to prevent a selection bias by ignoring all 
observations with incomplete data and to keep the sample size high, missing data were 
imputed. A set of fundamental variables that are available for the greatest part of the students 
is selected among the explaining variables. In cases where these variables are missing, the 
average at the lowest level available is taken as an approximation, meaning first the class 
average, then school average or finally country average. Each of the other explaining 
variables is then regressed on this set of variables, and missing values in these other variables 
are substituted by the predicted value from this regression. In the case of qualitative data, the 
prediction was conducted on the basis of probit and ordered probit models.2 For the purposes 
of this paper, this data imputation was conducted separately within each country.  
The dataset that is built on TIMSS offers the unique opportunity to analyze and compare 
the educational systems in the seven transition countries. With the exception of Hungary and 
Poland, the earlier communist countries have not previously participated in an international 
cross-country study on student achievement. The dataset allows for the first estimation of 
educational production functions for this large group of Eastern European countries. 
Moreover, the quality of the available data with the immense background information on 
                                                          
1 For more detailed information on TIMSS, see the internet homepage http://timss.bc.edu. 
2 For more details on the imputation method, see Wößmann (2003). 
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various inputs and the quantity, with data available for between 4,976 and 7,471 students in 
the individual countries, allow for a very thorough analysis. The sampling design to test two 
adjacent grades of each school also permits to estimate the between-grade variation, as will be 
discussed later on in the identification strategy.  
An obvious limitation of each cross-sectional study is that data are only available for one 
point in time. It is therefore impossible to control for prior educational achievement and to 
consider the added value of a school year to students separately. Instead, the data compare the 
level of student achievement. Further possible limitations are missing variables for state or 
regional factors. Omitting them in the regressions might lead to a bias of coefficients. 
Aggregation of data above the state level is likely to exacerbate this problem (Hanushek et al. 
1996), which does not apply to the micro-level database used here, though. 
 
3.2 Description of Country Data  
This section sketches the different schooling systems by considering the most noticeable 
mean values of the explanatory variables given in the data and used in the estimated models. 
The definitions and ranges of value of all 25 variables are given in Table A2, while Table A3 
displays their mean values and standard deviations.  
A distinction between the two groups is evident in the mean test scores that the students 
achieved in TIMSS. The four countries of the first group all reach mean scores in both math 
and science that lie above the international mean of 500. They even accomplish higher scores 
than most Western European nations, including Denmark, France and Germany. Czech 
students performed best among the participating transition countries, with average scores of 
544 in math and 553 in science. The countries of the second group instead all scored below 
the international mean of 500, with Lithuania as the worst performer with 454 points in math, 
superior only to Portugal in Europe. The spread of the test scores is lowest in the low scoring 
Baltic States and highest for the Czech Republic, Hungary and also for Romania.  
Overall, the parents of the tested students are well educated, with the slight exception of 
Romania. The average class size varies within the two groups of transition countries, being 
lowest in the Baltic States with around 22 students per class and highest in Slovakia and 
Romania with a class size of over 26. The share of female teachers is around 80 percent in the 
transition countries.  
The separation between the two groups of EU accession countries holds also for the 
descriptive statistics of other variables. The second group has a higher share of students from 
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broken families, of parents belonging to the lowest educational group and a lower average 
education, except for Lithuania. The second group suffers more from a shortage of materials 
in schools and has fewer well-educated teachers. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are 
instead well endowed with materials and well-educated teaching staff. The schooling systems 
are most decentralized in Hungary and Slovenia and still very centralized in Romania.  
 
3.3 Regression Models and Techniques 
3.3.1 The Basic Specification 
To estimate educational production functions for the individual countries at the student level, 
the following general model will be employed: 
 (1) ics s cs cs ics ics I R B T ε ν β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0  
where T is the math or science test score of student i in class c at school s, B is a set of 
background variables on the student and her family, R are measures of resources used and 
teacher characteristics, I is a set of variables reflecting the institutional setting and ν and ε are 
error terms at the school and student level, respectively.3  
The survey design of TIMSS demands specific regression techniques for the estimation of 
the educational production functions. The sampling design of TIMSS contains both varying 
sampling probabilities for students from different schools and clustered data. Giving different 
weights to students who had different sampling probabilities allows obtaining nationally 
representative coefficient estimates. This is done by applying weighted least squares (WLS) 
as a regression technique for all regressions performed with the data (cf. Wooldridge 2001).  
The second issue of clustered data is more troublesome. In each country, participating 
schools were chosen in a first step, and then the classes which took the standardized tests 
within each school. Therefore, the primary sampling units (PSU) are not the individual 
observations, the students, but instead their schools. The problem arises that the observations 
within the cluster of a school are not independent as they share common characteristics, which 
cannot be totally controlled for. The error term of the regression may therefore be more 
complex than assumed by conventional least-squares methods, comprising besides an 
                                                          
3 The information on individual student test scores and background variables provided by the TIMSS micro-level 
database allows for a more precise estimation of coefficients and less bias than does aggregated data used for 
most estimations (Card and Krueger 1996). Although also using the TIMSS database, Hanushek and Luque 
(2002) do not employ it at the student level but aggregate it to the classroom level instead.   
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individual component also class and school elements. Ignoring these latter parts can lead to 
spurious regression results, as the supposedly independent observations depend on each other.  
The method of clustering-robust linear regression (CRLR) offers a solution to the obstacle. 
It allows for any dependence of observations within the PSU, demanding only independence 
across PSUs. Ignoring the cluster design and treating dependent observations as independent 
by using standard formulas would result in standard errors that are too small (White 1980). 
There is no impact on the coefficients of the parameters, however. Therefore, the standard 
errors estimated by OLS, or in our case WLS, need to be corrected. The clustering-robust 
variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates )(β))V  can be approached by 
(2) 11 ))('()()( −− ′′′= ∑ WXXXWeeWXWXXV ss
s
ssssβ
))
, 
where β)  represents the coefficients β0 to β3 from model (1), the matrix X all explanatory 
variables, W is the weight matrix and ssee ′  are the cluster matrices of the WLS residuals from 
each cluster es (White 1980: 821; see also Deaton 1997: 73-78). 
This formula offers a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the WLS 
estimator, even if the error variances differ across clusters and arbitrary correlation patterns 
exist within clusters. A supposition is a fixed cluster size as the sample size increases, which 
is fulfilled because the number of students tested in each school is independent of the overall 
number of students in the sample. For the estimation of the educational production functions 
of the individual countries, model (1) will be estimated by CRLR. Hence, the WLS 
coefficients and clustering-robust estimated standard errors will be presented for the 
production functions. Whenever merged data of several countries are analyzed, a dummy for 
each but one country is included in the regressions. This allows for a correlation of error terms 
within countries, which is likely.  
3.3.2 Estimating the Effect of Resources 
The impact of a school’s resource endowment on its students’ educational achievement is a 
hotly disputed topic in the literature on educational production (cf. Hanushek 2003; Krueger 
2003). The causality of the resource-performance link is ambiguous since the supposedly 
exogenous resource variables might be influenced by actual performance of the students and 
might thus be endogenous. Estimating the effect of resources, especially of class size, on 
student achievement is therefore burdensome. Inasmuch as the TIMSS data come from an 
observational study and not an experiment, the coefficient may be biased by the non-random 
allocation of students to different class sizes, both between schools and within schools. 
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Controlling for these biases is essential in order to obtain a consistent estimate for the effect 
of resources.  
Several mechanisms are imaginable that lead to the non-random allocation of students 
between schools, depending on the schooling system. Parents may either move to districts that 
offer smaller classes to their children, or the local school administration might put worse 
performing students into schools with smaller classes, especially when various types of 
schools are available. In both cases, between-school sorting takes place and biases the 
estimator of the class-size effect.  
One strategy to eliminate all variation between schools is to control for school fixed 
effects. For its implementation, a dummy variable D for each school is included in model (1), 
leading to the function 
 (3) ics cs ics s ics R B D T ε β β β α + + + + = 2 1 0 .  
The institutional variables I that are mostly determined at the school level, are not included in 
this model because the inclusion of the school dummies removes all possible variation 
between them. This model is referred to as school fixed effects (SFE) model.  
Having controlled for between-school variation and having only between grade variation 
left, a potential bias may still stem from within-school sorting. In order to account for the non-
random allocation of students to different class sizes within a school, the technique of 
instrumental variables (IV) is used. Akerhielm (1995) instrumented actual class size with 
average class size for a given subject in the school and student enrollment at the given grade. 
The legitimacy of using student enrollment as an instrument is questionable, however, as 
overall school enrollment may also exert an impact on student achievement (Summers and 
Wolfe 1975; Angrist and Lavy 1999).  
In this analysis, actual class size is instrumented by average class size at the grade level. It 
is highly correlated with actual class but not with the error term. It affects student 
achievement only indirectly through the impact on actual class size. For the regression, a two-
stage least squares estimation is used. Actual class size S is regressed on average class size at 
the grade level A, the other exogenous variables Ψ and the school dummies D: 
(4) Sc = α1Ac + α 2Ψics + α 3Ds+ εics.  
 10 
The predicted value cS
)
 = Sc – εics consists of the non-random part Sc and the random part εics. 
Using only the systematic part of Sc, no correlation will exist between cS
)
 and εics, allowing 
the second stage of the regression to produce a consistent estimator for class size: 
(5) Tics = γ1 cS
)
+ γ 2 Ψics + γ 3Ds + εics. 
Having controlled for between- and within-school sorting effects, the coefficient γ1 is then an 
estimate of the causal relationship between class size and student achievement. Model (5) 
combines the school fixed effects model and the instrumental variable technique and is 
referred to as SFE+IV.4 The only variation left to explain is within-school between-grade 
variation. Therefore, comparable data are needed for at least two grades, if possible adjacent 
ones, for each school to implement this estimation strategy. Fortunately, the TIMSS data 
fulfill this requirement and thus the regression strategy can be implemented. 
 
4.  Results 
The results of the estimation of educational production functions for the seven transition 
countries are discussed separately for each category of explanatory variables. In addition, a 
closer look is paid to possible interaction effects and to the effect of resources that are 
measured in the form of class size.  
 
4.1 Results of the Educational Production Functions 
The production functions have all been estimated by CRLR (cf. section 3.3.1) using model 
(1). First, only the student background variables are regressed on the test scores, then the 
resource and the institutional variables are added to the production function, respectively.  
4.1.1 Student Background 
The variables of the student background in Table 2 feature the largest and most significant 
coefficients of the production function, which is in line with the results from other estimations 
in the literature. The coefficient for ‘Upper grade’ is the largest one of the function in absolute 
terms and varies between 87 in LTU and only 34 in ROM. It is statistically significant at the 
one percent level in all countries and has a positive sign as could be expected. The coefficient 
indicates the value added at the eighth grade. In general, it is higher in the countries that have 
                                                          
4 See Wößmann and West (2002) for details on the SFE+IV method.  
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a higher mean test score, with the exception of LTU. The effect of age is negative because we 
control for the grade level. A one-year-older student, all else equal, scores on average more 
than 33 points less in CSK, which is a third of the international standard deviation of the test 
scores. In ROM instead, the difference is only 7 points. Female students score on average 
lower than their male counterparts in the subjects of math and science. Only in LTU for math, 
they score significantly better at the 10 percent level.  
Students who were not born in the respective country could be expected to perform worse. 
For math, this is only statistically significantly the case in CSK, whereas the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in ROM and statistically 
insignificant in the other countries. For science, statistically significantly negative coefficients 
are reported for CSK, HUN, SVN, LTU and LVA. The general trend in the countries implies 
that immigrant students are still disadvantaged, with the exception of ROM. There, the 
enormous effort of integration and their special rights like the provision of text books in 
minority languages seem to have fostered their educational achievement more than that of 
other students. In LVA, which has a huge share of immigrated Russian students, the 
integration is not successful and might partly explain the low average score of LVA students. 
In CSK and HUN, students living with both parents performed statistically significantly better 
than students not living with both parents.  
The highest level of education achieved by the students’ parents is of great importance. 
The effect of completed secondary education is highest in CSK with 24 points difference to 
students of parents with some or no secondary education in the case of math. However, it is 
statistically insignificant in HUN, LTU, LVA and ROM for the science estimates. This may 
be due to the high share of originally missing values, which have been imputed. In the four 
countries, over a fifth of the observations for the parents’ educational level are missing. In 
LTU, over 40 percent are imputed. The impact of finished university education is even higher, 
up to 49 points in SVN for math, and is statistically significant at the one percent level in all 
countries except for ROM for science. In ROM, the difference to the reference group is lowest 
with only 21 points, and it is rather low in LTU and LVA as well.  
The variable ‘Books at home’, which is included in its logarithmic form, has a statistically 
significantly positive coefficient at the one percent level in each country.5 Its value is greatest 
in CSK and HUN, where a one-unit increase on the natural logarithmic scale, equivalent to a 
                                                          
5 Using the natural logarithmic form for ‘Books at home,’ as well as of ‘Teacher experience,’ makes the 
production function non-homothetic. This implies that the marginal effect of particular variables depends on 
their level or the scale of production. Figlio (1999) illustrates that this functional form is more likely to grasp the 
‘true’ effect of resources.  
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multiplication of the value by 2.7, improves the test score by 23 points. For ROM, the value is 
almost half of it, only 12 points. In LVA and LTU, the values are also rather low, whereas the 
other countries are closer to the Czech and Hungarian level. The variable has a huge influence 
on the test score. All else equal, a student whose parents have around 200 books at home 
scores over 100 points higher in math compared to a student with hardly any books at home, 
in the countries of the first group. 
The location of the community has a statistically significant impact only in HUN and 
ROM, where students who live close to the center of a town score up to 20 points higher than 
students from non-urban areas. The community location should make a positive difference in 
countries with a low accessibility of schools in rural areas. In ROM, this has been described 
as a problem of the schooling system. Moreover, other effects of group pressure that depend 
on the community type and are not included in other variables may play a role.  
The coefficients from the regressions for the science test score are very close to the math 
estimates but on average slightly lower. This suggests that student characteristics and 
background have less effect on the science test score, so that it depends on a student’s 
‘quality’ to a lesser degree. Probably the students’ interest in the subject, which is not 
captured by the included variables, makes a greater difference in science. The only coefficient 
that is consistently larger in absolute terms for science is the one on students’ sex. The 
negative effect of being a female student is even greater in science than in math. In CSK, this 
effect almost offsets half the effect of being in a higher grade, which makes a huge difference. 
Female students’ enthusiasm is thus even lower for science than for math, if we do not expect 
them to be less capable, which would be a cultural effect.  
Across the different countries, a pattern of the magnitude of the effects is apparent. In CSK 
and HUN, the coefficients always have the greatest values in absolute terms. In ROM and 
LVA instead, the values are the lowest whenever they are statistically significant, except for 
the community location. In general, the countries belonging to the first group have higher 
coefficients than the countries of the second group. This pattern is especially clear for the 
variables concerning the students’ family background. Table 3 illustrates the impact that the 
difference between the worst and best scenario of possible student characteristics and 
backgrounds has on the math and science test scores. For the worst scenario, students are 
deemed to be one year older, female, immigrants, not living with both parents, their parents 
have no or only some secondary education, about five books at home and live in a rural area. 
This scenario is compared to the best possible one: younger, male, native, living together with 
both parents, parents having finished university education, about 250 books at home and 
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living close to the center of a town. Only the coefficients that are statistically significant at the 
five percent level are considered for the computation reported in Table 3.  
The numbers underline both the importance of the background variables for test score 
differences and the reported distinction between the first and the second group of countries. 
The impact of 219 points in CSK for math makes up for almost half the test score mean of the 
country. Furthermore, the effect is lower for science than for math, except for LVA. The 
lower coefficients in the second group of countries imply that background differences 
between students affect the test scores less in this group. This suggests that in these countries, 
where the reform process commenced later and where, at least in the Baltic States, the 
Russian grip over the country was strongest, education’s role of producing an egalitarian 
society is still stronger marked than in the first group of countries. The outcomes are 
relatively low scores, lower variations in the test scores in these three countries and lower 
returns to individual characteristics in schools. The extreme two cases are ROM for a system 
that seems hardly unchanged from communist times and CSK with great returns to individual 
background features.  
4.1.2 Resources and Teacher Characteristics 
The coefficients of the category of resource and teacher inputs are shown in Table 4 and 
indicate the effects that differences in school endowments and in the teaching staff have on 
their students’ test scores, given the assumption that these endowments are exogenous to 
student performance. The estimated effects are useful for policy implications, as resources are 
allocated to schools by policy makers. Class size was chosen as the primary resource variable. 
Whenever it is highly statistically significant, it is positive. This is the case in CSK, LTU and 
ROM for math and in CSK for science. Only in LVA, the coefficient of science class size is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. However, half of the respective 
values are originally missing in LVA. The positive signs could be expected from prior studies 
but are counter-intuitive. An increase in the math class by one student in CSK is related to a 
2.23 points improvement of the students’ scores, all else equal. The policy implication of 
these least-squares estimates would be to raise class sizes and employ fewer teachers, which 
seems to conflict with common sense. However, as this result might be driven by a 
simultaneity bias, the evidence on class size is examined in greater detail in section 4.3.  
The specific needs of schools are reflected in the variable ‘Great shortage of materials’, as 
compared to some or no shortage. It is mostly negative, though it is statistically significant 
only in CSK and LTU, whereas it is positive in LVA. 
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The characteristics of teachers give only small insights into a further explanation of 
students’ test scores. Teachers’ sex has no statistically significant influence at all and the 
direction of a possible effect is not consistent across countries or between math and science. 
The high share of female teachers in the transition countries thus does not seem to have an 
impact on their average scores. The experience of teachers instead has a statistically 
significant impact in some countries. For math, positive effects are estimated in HUN and 
SLV and for science in ROM. The latter one has the highest value of 10 points per one-unit 
increase on the natural logarithmic scale, which corresponds roughly to a tripling of 
experience. Students with a science teacher who has 7.4 (20) years of experience score 10 
points better than students with a teacher with only 2.7 (7.4) years of experience. In science in 
CSK, the effect of experience is negative, although not statistically significant. This might be 
partly due to the high average age of teachers in the country, which is the highest of the 
sample. From a certain age on, additional experience might be outweighed by the age of the 
teacher. If this is the case for a large portion of teachers, the effect might turn the sign of 
experience even negative. Then the effect of experience would rather be reflected by a 
negative quadratic function than a logarithmic one. However, testing the function showed that 
it suited the data not as well as the logarithmic form in most countries.  
The educational level of teachers has ambiguous effects on students, which might depend 
on the low variation between the educational levels. These are mostly determined by the state. 
For science, the coefficient on teachers’ having a Bachelor degree is statistically significantly 
positive in SVN and statistically significantly negative in LTU. The highest educational level, 
which is equivalent to a Master or Ph.D., has a statistically significant positive effect in ROM 
for math and in CSK and ROM for science. For HUN and SLV, the sign is negative but not 
very informative due to the low variation. The large positive coefficient for the master level 
for math in ROM implies a huge difference of 52 points between students’ scores only due to 
their teacher’s education. However, as less than one percent of teachers in ROM preside of a 
master degree, the estimate may not be representative.  
The coefficients for resources and teacher characteristics are far less statistically significant 
and of a lower magnitude than those for the first category of student background variables. 
Moreover, the effects of greater endowments of schools are somewhat ambiguous. Most 
unexpected signs of effects can be attributed to the unusual distribution within countries, or 
are discussed more extensively later on in the case of class size. However, there is no 
consistent picture that clearly indicates the merits for students from greater resources or better 
staff. A proper endowment with materials, teachers’ experience and their educational level of 
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a Master’s degree still seem to be related to higher test scores of students in some cases. 
Possible beneficial side effects of the variables that are not grasped directly by the variable 
itself are examined later on in section 4.4 with the help of interaction variables. 
4.1.3 Institutional Setting 
Most of the variables that describe the institutional setting at the school level through stating 
the degree of responsibility and autonomy that school heads and teachers have are statistically 
insignificantly related to student performance. Table 5 presents the results. Concerning school 
responsibility, autonomy of schools over the budget, supplies and hiring teachers has a 
statistically significant coefficient only in HUN for math, where it is positive and of a high 
magnitude of almost 11 points for each additional field of autonomy. The positive effect may 
be attributable to the incentives imposed upon schools and teachers by central exams and 
curriculum, which are in place in all countries except for LVA and for science in ROM. When 
schools have the freedom to determine teacher salary instead, this has a statistically 
significantly negative coefficient in LTU for math and in HUN for science. The incentive for 
opportunistic behavior seems to be too high because it concerns foremost the benefit of 
teachers. Although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, CSK may be judged to feature 
the best incentive system, as all its coefficients of decentralization are positive.  
When teachers have a strong influence on the curriculum, the direction of the effect seems 
to depend on whether they act individually or collectively. In the former case, the coefficient 
is mostly positive, and the only statistically significant coefficient in CSK for math implies a 
difference of 14 points to the setting when individual teachers have no influence on the 
curriculum. The effect of a collective influence is instead negative in the majority of cases but 
never statistically significant. Individual or class teachers have an informational advantage 
and do not act as an interest group, which is the case for collective teachers’ influence or that 
of teacher unions. 
The possible impact of the subject teachers’ strong influence on specific matters is 
estimated by two variables. The first is about the money for supplies and subject matter, 
which is negative in the majority of countries. However, there is only one statistically 
significant coefficient in SVN for math, which is highly positive. The coefficient on the 
second variable on ‘Kind of supplies or textbooks’ is mostly positive, but statistically 
significant only in ROM for math, and there is a statistically significantly negative coefficient 
in HUN for science, although at a lower significance level.  
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The two further variables on the institutional setting, ‘Homework’ and ‘Uninterested 
parents limit teaching’, always have the expected signs (positive and negative, respectively) 
when they are statistically significant. For the former, this is the case in LVA and ROM for 
science and in CSK for math. For the latter, it is the case in CSK and LVA for math and in 
CSK and SVN for science. When the teacher notices that parents’ unwillingness to cooperate 
limits his teaching, students in CSK score on average around 20 points less than if not. An 
additional hour of average homework per week for math increases test scores by 19 points in 
CSK, all else equal. In HUN, LTU, SLV and SVN, homework has no statistically significant 
influence on either math or science scores.  
A major shortcoming of the results for the effects of the institutional setting on students’ 
test scores is the weak statistical significance of the coefficients. They point in the expected 
direction in the majority of cases and are often of a considerable magnitude, but no 
unambiguous conclusion can be drawn due to their high standard errors. The limited number 
of schools, around 150 per country, allows only for little measurable variation within a 
country and leads to low degrees of freedom when all 23 explaining variables are included in 
the regression. This concerns the variables on school responsibility and teacher influence on 
the curriculum, which are measured at the school level. For the other variables, which are 
measured at the class level, the degrees of freedom should suffice but the effects are not clear-
cut either. It seems that differences in the institutional setting are mainly relevant for 
understanding the cross-country variation in student performance (Wößmann 2003), whereas 
the descriptive statistics in Table A3 show that there is hardly any variation in the institutional 
setting within most Eastern European countries which could lead to a variation in test scores. 
Still, if we compare the optimal institutional setting with the least favorable one, taking into 
account only coefficients that are statistically significant at least at the ten percent level, 
students score on average around 50 points higher in CSK for math and around 20 points for 
science. A difference of 50 points is half of the international standard deviation of test scores 
and around a tenth of the mean score. Hence, institutions do matter in some countries, and 
their setting should not be neglected, especially since a modification might be achievable at 
lower cost than in the other categories.  
4.1.4 Explanatory Power of the Three Categories of Variables 
The statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients from the three categories of 
variables are reflected in their contribution to the explanatory power of the models as seen in 
the values of R2 in Table 6. The 9 student background variables explain the greatest share of 
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the variation in test scores. The contributions of the other two categories, resources and 
institutional settings, which comprise 6 and 8 variables, respectively, are only supplementary 
and comparable in size to each other. Table 6 reflects only one order in which the categories 
appear in the function, which can influence the R2. Altering the order of appearance changes 
little, however. The highest R2 for the entire model is reached in LTU, where a quarter of the 
variation of the science test scores can be explained by the production function. ROM instead 
features the lowest values in both math and science, which is only slightly above 11 percent. 
The values differ greatly between countries, which might either suggest that the model used to 
estimate the production function suits certain countries better or that the quality of the data is 
lower in others.  
4.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis of the Imputation Technique 
The estimations of the production functions have also been performed with the original values 
only. For each variable included in model (1), all imputed values (cf. section 3.1) have been 
dropped. These ‘robust’ estimates are not affected by the method of imputation. This 
sensitivity analysis of the results examines whether changes in the data, in this case the 
introduction of changes through the imputation of values, alter the outcome of the regressions, 
in which case inferences from these data would seem fragile (Mukherjee et al. 1998). 
In general, there are no great distinctions between the two differently estimated 
coefficients for each variable. No statistically significant variable changes its sign. However, 
some statistically insignificant variables change signs and for others the statistical significance 
level changes. This is often the case for variables that belong to the set of fundamental 
variables and have over 20 percent of missing values. Then, just the average of the next 
highest level is taken as an approximation. In HUN and LTU this can be observed for the 
coefficients of the educational level of parents, which are always less statistically significant 
with the imputed values included. For variables that do not belong to the fundamental set, the 
imputation technique seems to be more efficient. They are imputed by taking the expected 
values from a previous regression on the set of fundamental variables (cf. section 3.1). The 
coefficients for the effect of science class in LVA, where more than half of the values are 
missing, are almost identical.  
Given that the estimates are so close to each other, the imputation technique should not 
have led to a bias of the data and the inferences are not fragile. Having the full dataset 
available for the estimations is a great advantage because the higher amount of observations 
allows for a better explanation of the variation. This is shown by the decreasing standard 
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errors. Basing the estimation of the effect of school or class differences on even fewer 
observations might have led to even weaker inferences. Thus, the imputation of missing 
values was a worthwhile step in the estimation of the educational production functions. 
 
4.2 Interaction Effects 
This section considers possible interaction effects between variables of the educational 
production function. The interaction terms have been included separately at the end of model 
(1) and indicate any further effects a variable may have in connection with other variables.6  
In both math and science, students seem to perform better under a teacher of the same sex. 
This is true for both boys and girls. The additional effect of teacher experience of teachers 
who hold a Master degree on students varies across countries. It is twice statistically 
significantly negative in ROM, due to the extremely high coefficient of the Master level. In 
HUN, the effect is statistically significantly positive for science, where the coefficient of a 
Master degree is statistically significantly negative, and negative for math, where the Master 
coefficient is positive. The interaction effects seem thus to offset some of the counterintuitive 
effects in the production function. The effect of class size does not consistently depend on the 
experience of teachers or on their educational level. When teachers hold a Master degree, 
class size exerts an additional significantly negative effect on student performance in three 
cases and a significantly positive effect in two cases.  
When the students’ parents have more than 200 books, the positive coefficient of class size 
is intensified in five countries. This might be a further proof of the selection of low 
performing students to smaller classes and consequently of better performing students to 
rather larger classes, if we assume that the number of books at home is a proxy for student 
ability but does not fully capture the effect. The positive interaction term is in line with the 
hypothesis of Lazear (2001) that the optimal class size for good students is larger than that for 
bad students, who disrupt learning in the classroom.  
 
4.3 Analyses of the Class-Size Effect 
In order to give more scrutiny to the possible endogeneity bias in the least-squares estimation 
of resource effects, we analyze the class-size effect in greater detail. We first look at class-size 
effects in different segments of class sizes to see whether this is indicative of sorting of 
students into differently sized classes, and then we implement the model combining school 
                                                          
6 Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.   
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fixed effects and instrumental variables derived in section 3.3.2 to eliminate any effects of 
between- and within-school sorting from the estimate of the class-size effect.  
4.3.1 Class-Size Effects for Class Segments 
In each country, the class-size effect is estimated separately for three segments of class sizes, 
the lower, middle and upper segment. Each segment in a country is constructed to contain 
approximately the same number of students, so that the segments cover different class sizes 
across the countries. In CSK (HUN) for example, the lower segment comprises classes up to a 
class size of 23 (21), the middle one classes between 24 (22) and 26 (25) and the upper classes 
with more than 26 (25) students. In order to avoid further bias, all explanatory variables of the 
production function are included in the estimation and control for other effects. As the number 
of classes whose size is estimated is greatly reduced in the regressions, standard errors of the 
class-size coefficient increase for the individual categories.  
It is enticing to compare the overall coefficients of class size to the coefficients from the 
segments. If the coefficients for class size of the segmented student population were mainly 
consistent and pointed in the same direction as the overall coefficient, this would give 
evidence for no selection bias. Then the effect would be identical for different ranges of class 
sizes. However, if there were greatly varying coefficients and especially statistically 
significantly negative ones among them, this would point to an outside involvement like the 
non-random allocation of students. If this were the case and the low-performing students were 
put into smaller classes, then the effect for a limited range within which no selection takes 
place might still be negative. If the segment coefficients were negative but the overall 
coefficient positive, a selection between segments would seem likely. A positive coefficient 
would indicate that selection takes place within the considered range instead.  
The results shown in Table 7 cannot reveal any clear evidence on whether between- or 
within-school selection takes place, though. The results from the segmented class-size 
estimations are not very consistent. For each country, both positive and negative coefficients 
are reported, with the exception of LVA with only negative coefficients. There are 11 
statistically significantly positive coefficients versus 4 statistically significantly negative 
coefficients. For the merged dataset EAST that contains all seven transition countries and 
country dummies, there are statistically significantly positive coefficients for the overall 
estimates and statistically significantly positive ones for math in the middle and upper 
segment. The variation of the coefficients is greatest in the middle segment and lowest in the 
lower segment. For science more negative coefficients are estimated as compared to math, 
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where only the LVA coefficient in the upper segment is statistically significantly negative. 
The inconsistency of the coefficients across countries and across segments can be interpreted 
as an indication of a possible bias of the class-size coefficient in the production function but is 
clearly no proof of it.  
4.3.2 Eliminating Effects of Between- and Within-School Selection 
In order to control for selection that takes place between schools when measuring the class-
size effect, a dummy for each school in the country is added to the regression, leading to the 
SFE model (3) derived in section 3.3.2. The few schools that tested only one class are 
excluded from the estimation of this model. The class-size coefficients of the SFE model 
shown in Table 8 are smaller than for the previous regression in all countries except for LTU 
and ROM. The standard errors increase only slightly in some cases. The results indicate that 
when excluding the effect of between-school selection of students, a positive effect of class 
size on test scores appears less likely. The change is most drastic in CSK, where the 
statistically significantly positive class-size coefficient turns negative for math and is around 
zero for science. In LVA for math, a statistically significantly negative coefficient results 
from the control for school fixed effects. The only positive remaining coefficients are in LTU 
and ROM for math and in ROM for science. In these two countries, the different model had 
hardly any influence on the coefficients.  
In a second step, the selection within schools is additionally controlled for by using the 
average class size at the grade level as an instrument for actual class size (cf. section 3.3.2). 
The model and corresponding technique (SFE+IV) can only be applied to three countries, for 
which sufficient data are available on the instrument. For math, the consistent model leads to 
slightly positive coefficients in CSK and SVN, which are statistically highly insignificant, 
though. In ROM, the former significantly positive coefficient turns negative. This is as well 
the case for science, where all three coefficients for class size are negative, however still 
insignificantly. The estimates correspond to the intuitive reasoning that a smaller classroom is 
a better learning environment for students and should benefit their scores. The relatively large 
standard errors of the coefficients do not allow for pinpointing the exact effect. It can only be 
said that it is approximately close to zero or even slightly negative. The results do not support 
a positive resource-performance link, but they do show that the counterintuitive least-squares 
coefficients are likely to be biased.  
In CSK, selection between schools seems to be the major cause of bias in the class-size 
coefficient. Low performing students seem to be allocated to schools that have lower class 
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sizes than those schools of the better students. In ROM instead, between-school selection 
seems to introduce no bias, but within-school selection does seem to. Low performing 
students are not selectively allocated to certain schools but to certain classes of lower size 
within schools. This might as well be the case in LTU and could explain the statistically 
significantly positive coefficient of class size after controlling for SFE. The difference in the 
origin of the selection bias seems to be related to the structure of the school system. In the 
more diverse systems in CSK and HUN, students of the considered age of about 13 can 
choose between two types of schools, and the more able students are allocated into the 
gymnazium. In ROM instead, only the general school exists and students cannot be selected. 
Therefore, if low performing students are to receive more resources, any selection has to take 
place within schools.  
 
5 Comparison to Western European Countries 
In order to see how far the different Eastern European school systems have converged 
towards the Western European ones, we compare the educational production functions of 
Eastern and Western European countries. The merged functions of all Eastern European 
countries (EAST), of the first group of countries (FIRST) and of the second group of 
countries (SECOND) are compared to a sample of Western European countries (WEST) that 
includes Austria, Denmark, France and Germany. They all are central European countries and 
long time members of the EU and should hence be well suited for a comparison. The 
respective country dummies are added to the regressions.  
If the aforementioned assumption is true that the schooling systems of the first group of 
countries have already moved significantly towards those of democratic market economies, 
then the production function of the Western European sample should resemble more the 
function of the first group than that of the second group. Table 9 presents the coefficients of 
estimating model (1) with the math scores as the dependent variable. The mean math scores in 
the bottom right indicate that the average performance of the sample of Western European 
countries is only slightly above the average for Eastern Europe and right between the first and 
the second group of countries. The coefficients for WEST are clearly closer to the first group 
and are often opposed to the estimates of the second group. In the following, we compare the 
estimates of the Western European countries mainly to those of the first group and refer to the 
mean values of the explanatory variables.  
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In the category of student characteristics and background, the coefficients of WEST and 
FIRST are very close to each other, except for ‘immigrant’, where the effect in WEST is 
clearly negative. The integration of immigrant students in schools seems to succeed better in 
the former communist countries, which were accustomed to integrate workers and their 
families from other communist countries. Moreover, the Western countries have higher shares 
of immigrated students, which may complicate integration. The average education of 
students’ parents is lower in WEST than in both Eastern groups. The number of books at 
home in WEST is instead slightly higher than in the second group but well below that of the 
first group. It is obvious that returns to the individual characteristics and the effects of student 
background are higher in WEST and the first Eastern group than in the second Eastern group. 
In the latter, education has not fully taken over the role of differentiation of students for their 
later work in the labor market. Instead, schools still seem to be supposed to diminish the 
impact of student characteristics and produce a homogenous output of students. The lower 
standard deviation of the math test score of the second group reflects this focus of educational 
policy. However, the countries of the first group might have overshot their mark because their 
standard deviations are already above that of the Western European countries. Allowing for 
too much deviation between students’ performance might result in a great gap between social 
groups and pose a threat to the social consensus.  
The positive class-size coefficient is even bigger in Western Europe than in the two groups 
that have a higher average class size. A shortage of materials is reported rarely in WEST and 
the first group but by every third school of the second group. Its positive effect on test scores 
in WEST is counterintuitive. The impact of teacher characteristics and education is very 
similar, except for the estimate of the highest educational level of teachers. In WEST, no 
estimate apart from class size and teachers’ sex is statistically significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, both coefficients of teachers’ education are opposed to the expected results. 
The difference between the 40 percent share of female teachers in WEST and that of over 80 
percent in EAST is striking. The share of teachers that obtained a Bachelor degree is highest 
in the second group and for a Master degree in the first group, while the Western countries 
have mean values in between the two groups. 
The estimates of the category on the institutional setting of the Western sample are again 
consistent with the expected effects and closer to those of the first group. On average, schools 
in WEST have a lower degree of autonomy than those of the first group, where it is highest, 
and even those of the second group. However, the influence of teachers is higher in Western 
countries. The distinction between the positive effect of individual teachers’ and the negative 
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effect of collective teachers’ influence on the curriculum is especially apparent. The highly 
statistically significant impact of homework and uninterested parents is also striking. 
The findings of the comparison are consistent with the prior assumption that the schooling 
systems of the Western European sample are closer to the first group of Eastern European 
countries. In several aspects like the returns to individual student characteristics and the 
deviation of test scores, the first group seems to have surpassed the Western countries already. 
It might be hypothesized that the differentiation of students may decrease again in the first 
group in the following years, when the biggest transitional steps have been achieved and an 
equilibrium between the new market forces and the need for social cohesion has been found. 
The equalization of educational outcomes is characteristic for the second group instead and is 
illustrated by the low effects of student characteristics on their performance and the lower 
deviation of test scores. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis of the schooling systems of seven Eastern European countries by means of 
estimating their educational production functions reveals several distinctive features. First, the 
countries can be divided into two groups, which share similar characteristics in their 
economic development, the properties of their schooling systems and the effects that the 
various factors have on student test scores. The first group of countries, which includes the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, commenced the political and economic 
reforms earlier than the second group and features a higher level of both political and 
economic development. In the second group, the Baltic States instead remained under tight 
Russian control until 1991 and suffered great economic damage from this strong link. 
Romania’s political struggles delayed any reforms and turned it into the political and 
economic laggard of this sample of Eastern European countries. Concerning their schooling 
systems, the average student of the first group is endowed with more favorable characteristics 
and a higher level of directly measurable resources at schools, especially in the two countries 
of the former Czechoslovakia. Further, the first group features the two most decentralized 
schooling systems with Hungary and Slovenia.  
When regarding the impact that the individual factors have on student performance, as 
estimated by the educational production function, distinct patterns emerge for both groups. 
The effects of the very significant variables on student background, especially of family 
circumstances, are consistently higher in the first group, which introduced reforms to the 
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education systems earlier and seems to have changed the role of education away from forming 
an egalitarian society into a mode of differentiation for the labor market. The comparison to 
the sample of Western European countries underlines the move that the first group has made 
away from communist to Western schooling systems during the first four to five years of 
transition. It even surpasses the Western sample in several specific features, such as the high 
returns to individual characteristics of students and a higher variation in test scores. In the 
second group, returns to individual characteristics and especially to family background are 
instead lower and students’ performance varies less. This gives students more equal 
opportunities irrespective of their background but seems to be associated with a lower average 
performance. Thus, the second group still features the patterns of a schooling system whose 
primary role is to produce a homogenous output of students.  
The coefficients for resources and the institutional setting are less significant and of a 
much lower magnitude in all countries and not consistent within groups. The merit of 
increased resources is illustrated for the experience and educational level of teachers in most 
countries. The effect of class size remains ambiguous, but positive coefficients were shown to 
be biased by student selection. Thus, it seems more likely that there is no effect or even a 
slightly negative one, especially for lower levels of class sizes. As the reduction of class size 
is very costly, it is doubtful whether a minor negative effect of larger classes justifies the 
enormous effort of decreasing class sizes. Although the institutional setting has comparatively 
little impact compared to student background, differences in the autonomy of schools and 
teachers are shown to matter in some countries and are relatively effortless to modify in order 
to improve student performance. 
The findings of this paper carry implications for the potential future development of the 
transition countries’ economies. The tested students have by now reached an age of about 21 
and are about to enter the labor market. The measured schooling quality is thus to take effect 
on the countries’ economies in the coming years. Besides the relatively advantageous 
economic and political situation, the first group of transition countries also presides over well 
functioning schooling systems. The high development of institutions is visible in the 
favorable incentive system in schools, where decentralization has widely progressed and 
positively affects student scores. Coming entrants into the labor markets are well educated, 
which should make them competitive to the EU labor market. The quick transformation of the 
schooling system in the early years of transition despite the financial and political hurdles is a 
good foundation for economic growth in the coming years. However, the high spread of test 
scores and the differentiation of students according to their background may result in a higher 
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inequality of income. A higher spread of income might be beneficial for short-term economic 
growth during the transition phase and might reflect entrepreneurial qualities of people, but it 
might threaten the social consensus in the long term.  
 The second group of transition countries instead has not fully reformed its schooling 
systems yet. The countries still feature many traits from communist times. Institutional 
reforms may need to be continued in the coming years. The transition will take longer than for 
the first group, and the labor markets may not yet be competitive to the markets of their 
Western neighbors due to the low quality and focus on homogeneity of the schooling systems. 
The low effect of student background on performance and the generally lower test-score 
variations speak against a rapid increase in the spread of the income distribution.  
In the analysis of educational production in Eastern Europe, there is great scope for further 
research. It would be desirable to find further methods for bias control that leave more 
variation in test scores and are applicable to other inputs as well. Further, it would be 
interesting to study the development of other outcomes of education like social values 
conveyed to students, which are essential to form a steady democracy. Another path for 
further studies would be to compare the findings from TIMSS to other studies that were 
performed later, like TIMSS-Repeat in 1999 or PISA in 2000. This could reveal whether the 
trends of the schooling systems towards decentralization and choice have continued and 
whether the distinction between the two groups of countries still holds. 
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Table 1: Transitional Progress and Education Systems in the Eastern European Countries 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Population in ‘000e 10,264 10,106 1,930 5,415 3,611 2,385 22,364 
GDP/capita US$ 1994a 3,977 4,052 7,231 2,721 1,143 1,442 1,323 
GDP/capita US$ 2000a 4,797 4,552 9,073 3,556 3,064 3,019 1,644 
Estimated GDP level 
in 2000, 1989=100b 98 104 114 103 65 64 77 
Private sector share of 
GDP in %, 2001b 80 80 65 80 70 65 65 
No. of chapters closed 
provisionally c 19 22 21 19 18 16 8 
Ed. exp. per student 
US$ in 1994d 671 840 1492 319 195 283 115 
Student pop. in ‘000f 1,146 1,360 189 804 512 299 2,461 
Enrollment in 1994g 99.5 99.1 96.7 97 92.2 89 91.4 
No. of school types for 
lower secondary 2 2 1 4 5 1 1 
Pre-primary education 
is partly obligatory no yes yes no no no yes 
Average attendance 
rate in pre-primary 86% 86.5% 59% 82% 40% 23.4% 65% 
a EBRD Transition Report 2001, Country Assessments. 
b EBRD Transition Report 2001, Table A3.1. 
c Acquis Communautaire chapters in negotiation on EU accession, EBRD Transition Report 2001, Box 2.2. 
d Total educational expenditure in 1994 US$ divided by population of age 3 to 24 in 1994, UNESCO Statistical 
Yearbook 1997 and Berryman (2000). 
e Mid 2001 estimates, CIA Factbook Country Profiles. 
f No. of children of compulsory school age in 2000. See Eurybase. 
g Enrollment rates for basic education, ages 6/7 – 14/15 in 1994, Berryman (2000), Table A6. 
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Table 2: Student Background and Educational Performance 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
 Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. 
Upper 
Grade 
70.92*  
(5.92) 
57.02*  
(5.54) 
63.49*  
(3.09) 
56.78*  
(3.44) 
63.05*  
(4.90) 
41.64*  
(4.18) 
61.06*  
(4.19) 
54.32*  
(4.08) 
67.25*  
(4.44) 
86.56*  
(4.56) 
48.51*  
(4.24) 
61.90*  
(4.25) 
33.90*  
(3.93) 
40.06*  
(5.11) 
Age -33.41
* 
(2.83) 
-18.30* 
(2.82) 
-31.63* 
(2.11) 
-23.51* 
(2.04) 
-22.46* 
(3.31) 
-13.20* 
(3.57) 
-20.73* 
(2.74) 
-18.77* 
(2.80) 
-23.97* 
(2.56) 
-16.63* 
(2.91) 
-16.87* 
(2.51) 
-11.96* 
(2.31) 
-7.85*  
(2.48) 
-6.73†  
(3.30) 
Female -13.34
* 
(3.25) 
-25.70* 
(2.72) 
-7.00*  
(2.36) 
-21.47* 
(2.28) 
-7.10*  
(2.42) 
-22.13* 
(2.64) 
-5.99†  
(2.39) 
-19.34* 
(2.45) 
4.36‡  
(2.67) 
-9.72*  
(2.64) 
-6.92*  
(2.41) 
-14.20* 
(2.42) 
-2.55  
(2.55) 
-9.01*  
(2.92) 
Immigrant -22.07
* 
(8.06) 
-14.45‡ 
(7.49) 
-7.26  
(8.36) 
-18.46‡ 
(10.00) 
1.87   
(4.18) 
-12.86* 
(3.68) 
-1.65  
(8.19) 
-11.64  
(8.46) 
-8.03  
(9.64) 
-14.02‡ 
(9.33) 
-14.29  
(7.39) 
-22.36† 
(9.03) 
16.09†  
(6.36) 
8.46   
(7.93) 
Living with 
both parents 
14.92*  
(4.83) 
9.39*  
(3.55) 
7.80‡  
(4.09)  
9.06†  
(4.15) 
2.36   
(3.87) 
-.04   
(3.70) 
1.65   
(2.74) 
-4.42‡  
(2.63) 
1.25  
(3.20) 
4.98   
(3.81) 
-.71  
(2.82) 
-2.69  
(3.09) 
-3.52  
(3.62) 
-3.91  
(4.51) 
Parents' 
education               
  Finished 
Secondary 
24.25*  
(3.51) 
14.82*  
(3.43) 
7.39‡  
(4.03) 
6.54   
(4.58) 
23.99*  
(2.90) 
16.40*  
(3.17) 
15.43*  
(3.25) 
12.32*  
(4.01) 
11.02‡  
(6.10) 
4.92   
(5.77) 
-.47   
(4.31) 
2.43   
(3.83) 
1.93   
(5.40) 
-1.02  
(7.19) 
  Finished 
University 
47.17*  
(4.68) 
33.59*  
(4.67) 
47.16*  
(6.14) 
37.18*  
(5.76) 
49.34*  
(4.22) 
36.08*  
(4.71) 
40.11*  
(4.51) 
35.56*  
(4.68) 
31.61*  
(6.59) 
23.10*  
(6.55) 
29.16*  
(5.32) 
25.13*  
(4.52) 
21.39*  
(7.03) 
20.85†  
(9.02) 
Books at 
home               
In ln 22.59
*  
(1.89) 
20.17*  
(1.85) 
22.61*  
(1.49) 
19.98*  
(1.51) 
18.57*  
(1.58) 
17.42*  
(1.58) 
21.54*  
(1.33) 
19.14*  
(1.40) 
17.92*  
(1.16) 
13.36*  
(1.44) 
15.39*  
(1.74) 
10.05*  
(1.63) 
11.97*  
(1.72) 
12.68*  
(2.05) 
Community 
location               
  Close to 
center 
5.75   
(7.93) 
1.81   
(5.14) 
8.90†  
(4.45)  
10.29*  
(3.75) 
-2.78  
(3.88) 
-1.47  
(3.32) 
-.18    
(5.70) 
-.90    
(5.36) 
7.34‡  
(4.32) 
2.71   
(4.58) 
4.69   
(4.92) 
1.00   
(4.22) 
19.98*  
(6.78) 
16.38†  
(8.31) 
cons 832.19
* 
(41.99) 
671.24* 
(39.08) 
796.56* 
(31.38) 
724.60* 
(29.55) 
706.08* 
(46.73) 
633.38* 
(50.86) 
671.68* 
(38.09) 
673.21* 
(39.78) 
647.59* 
(34.38) 
556.97* 
(41.41) 
603.36* 
(37.85) 
544.20* 
(33.03) 
506.50* 
(36.17) 
494.08* 
(48.99) 
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡10 percent. 
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 3: Score Differences Worst/Best Student Background Scenario 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Math 219 183 152 151 126 113 112 
Science 180 180 152 153 102 113 103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Resources, Teacher Characteristics, and Educational Performance 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
 Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. 
Class size 2.75*  
(.88) 
1.58† 
(.68) 
.40  
(.40) 
.26   
(.35) 
.35    
(.60) 
-.47   
(.56) 
.12   
(.50) 
.84   
(.72) 
1.83*  
(.53) 
-.25    
(.45) 
-.31   
(.31) 
-.43‡   
(.25) 
1.49*  
(.52) 
.68    
(.71) 
Great short. 
of materials 
-9.50‡  
(5.02) 
-7.08  
(6.47) 
6.54 
(5.00) 
6.65   
(4.26) 
-.06   
(5.04) 
-6.63  
(4.41) 
-7.29   
(5.72) 
2.09 
(6.56) 
-9.87‡ 
(5.17) 
-8.93‡  
(5.07) 
5.04   
(5.27) 
9.07†  
(4.46) 
-6.28  
(9.02) 
-10.51 
(9.42) 
Teacher 
characterist.               
  Teacher is 
female 
-5.02 
(6.49) 
-3.03 
(6.52) 
-4.72  
(5.67) 
2.72   
(3.79) 
-.03   
(4.98) 
1.32   
(4.37) 
4.06    
(6.88) 
6.85  
(5.45) 
5.12  
(6.03) 
6.75    
(5.74) 
-3.33  
(8.17) 
-1.68  
(4.64) 
8.65   
(7.20) 
3.35 
(8.05) 
  Teacher's 
exp. in ln 
1.34   
(4.11) 
-4.98 
(3.05) 
5.23† 
(2.29) 
1.00   
(2.25) 
2.65   
(3.36) 
.78    
(2.26) 
7.51‡   
(3.96) 
1.46  
(2.79) 
2.03  
(2.69) 
.34     
(2.31) 
1.69  
(2.55) 
-1.20  
(2.05) 
8.91   
(5.49) 
9.78†  
(4.43) 
Teacher's 
education               
  BA or 
equiv. 
No 
observ. 
No 
observ. 
-9.30  
(6.52) 
-2.36   
(5.14) 
3.69   
(7.10) 
9.46†  
(4.61) 
No 
observ. 
No 
variati
on 
4.82 
(8.76) 
-18.95‡ 
(10.04) 
5.39  
(10.51) 
6.80   
(4.57) 
7.33   
(6.44) 
11.24  
(7.24) 
  MA/Ph.D. 17.90 
(13.93) 
18.41† 
(7.92) 
20.09 
(15.00) 
-29.50† 
(14.27) 
No 
observ. 
No 
observ. 
-12.01‡ 
(6.21) 
No 
variati
on 
5.84  
(9.80) 
-7.59   
(10.64) 
-16.44 
(20.16) 
-5.97  
(14.03) 
51.49* 
(9.13) 
32.92* 
(12.48) 
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡10 percent. 
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for all student-background variables reported in 
Table 2. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5: Institutional Settings and Educational Performance 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
 Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. Math  Sci. 
School 
responsibilities 
              
 Autonomy  7.80   
(4.97) 
3.02   
(3.40) 
10.58‡  
(5.76) 
6.26   
(4.02) 
-3.09   
(6.38) 
-3.85   
(5.26) 
3.12 
(3.25) 
2.13   
(3.01) 
.77    
(4.27) 
-1.72   
(4.77) 
-6.43   
(6.58) 
-1.65   
(4.73) 
-3.45   
(3.53) 
-1.00   
(4.51) 
 Determining 
teacher’s salary 
8.12   
(6.95) 
5.92   
(5.36) 
-5.72   
(6.14) 
-7.24‡  
(4.11) 
3.28   
(4.25) 
.65    
(3.98) 
-6.52   
(6.89) 
-3.66   
(8.51) 
-10.87† 
(5.05) 
-.37    
(6.52) 
-1.73   
(5.41) 
-7.79   
(4.92) 
-2.56   
(10.65) 
-6.23   
(10.65) 
Strong infl. on 
curriculum 
              
 Teachers 
individually 
14.32‡  
(7.88) 
3.62   
(5.88) 
7.36   
(6.24) 
4.86   
(5.64) 
-.46    
(6.93) 
4.75   
(6.40) 
-3.12   
(9.26) 
-2.11   
(7.96) 
6.23   
(4.67) 
6.44   
(4.90) 
-3.04   
(4.79) 
-.96    
(4.13) 
10.37  
(11.24) 
15.70  
(10.47) 
 Teachers 
collectively 
-7.92   
(7.28) 
-2.72   
(5.08) 
1.14   
(5.52) 
1.60   
(5.08) 
6.31   
(8.91) 
-1.10   
(7.95) 
2.86   
(11.56) 
.70    
(9.94) 
-1.59   
(4.49) 
-1.55   
(5.20) 
3.14   
(5.20) 
3.00   
(4.33) 
-6.53   
(17.57) 
-3.08   
(19.86) 
Class teacher 
has strong 
influence on  
              
 Supplies or 
subject matter 
-.90    
(8.80) 
-5.33   
(4.39) 
2.47   
(4.55) 
5.57   
(3.48) 
16.12*  
(6.03) 
4.28   
(4.89) 
-.51    
(6.62) 
-.32    
(5.26) 
14.43  
(10.24) 
-10.67  
(6.65) 
-1.12   
(8.08) 
-3.09   
(5.15) 
-8.03   
(8.96) 
-12.25  
(9.75) 
 Kind supplies / 
textbooks 
4.90   
(5.17) 
4.19   
(4.70) 
2.99   
(5.35) 
-6.67‡  
(3.73) 
-4.74   
(3.76) 
-5.07   
(3.69) 
7.33   
(6.27) 
-2.07   
(4.99) 
-2.72   
(7.57) 
6.77   
(7.16) 
1.33   
(5.56) 
-.49    
(4.52) 
19.41†  
(8.28) 
-11.69  
(8.99) 
Additional                
 Homework 19.23‡  
(9.86) 
-6.62   
(10.15) 
3.22   
(3.57) 
-1.47   
(2.68) 
1.68   
(2.02) 
-4.82   
(6.56) 
2.07   
(3.13) 
9.26   
(10.40) 
-2.66   
(2.12) 
5.43   
(3.41) 
3.03   
(2.75) 
7.29†   
(2.82) 
1.93   
(1.29) 
10.07†  
(4.18) 
 Unint. parents 
limit teaching 
-19.79* 
(6.62) 
-19.11† 
(9.47) 
-8.40   
(6.65) 
1.84   
(5.71) 
.58    
(5.19) 
-7.43†  
(3.71) 
-1.38   
(8.01) 
-11.82  
(7.45) 
2.64   
(6.63) 
-7.69   
(9.61) 
-9.26‡  
(4.99) 
4.40   
(5.62) 
-.63    
(5.05) 
5.73   
(6.29) 
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡10 percent. 
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for all student-background variables reported in 
Table 2 and for all resource variables reported in Table 4. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 6: R2 of Regressions with Different Categories of Explanatory Variables  
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Math        
Student and family 
characteristics 0.1660 0.2121 0.1718 0.1424 0.2214 0.1208 0.0959 
+ Resources 0.1776 0.2169 0.1723 0.1455 0.2324 0.1239 0.1158 
+ Institutions 0.1996 0.2208 0.1770 0.1476 0.2379 0.1282 0.1253 
Science        
Student and family 
characteristics 0.1466 0.1711 0.1270 0.1241 0.2386 0.1356 0.0808 
+ Resources 0.1546 0.1730 0.1296 0.1264 0.2460 0.1404 0.0949 
+ Institutions 0.1615 0.1761 0.1321 0.1284 0.2505 0.1443 0.1111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Class-Size Coefficients for Class Segments  
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM EAST 
All students         
Math class 2.23
† 
(.94) 
.48 
(.39) 
.44 
(.60) 
.22 
(.51) 
1.64*     
(.53) 
-.36 
(.32) 
1.38*    
(.48) 
.80*    
(.20) 
Science class 1.25
‡     
(.69) 
.25 
(.35) 
-.51 
(.55) 
.86 
(.67) 
-.19 
(.44) 
-.43‡     
(.26) 
.69 
(.69) 
.37‡    
(.20) 
Lower segment         
Math class .30    (1.37) 
-.25    
(.93) 
-.32    
(1.82) 
.03    
(1.13) 
1.50   
(1.09) 
-1.35    
(.83) 
-.96    
(1.19) 
.24 
(.40) 
         
Science class -.51    (.93) 
-.17    
(.83) 
-3.07†   
(1.23) 
.85    
(1.02) 
1.46     
(1.23) 
-1.56    
(.97) 
-1.39    
(1.49) 
-.46    
(.41) 
Middle segment         
Math class 16.77
*    
(5.00) 
5.18‡     
(2.61) 
9.93*    
(3.72) 
-6.53    
(4.48) 
-.43    
(7.28) 
-1.96    
(2.19) 
-.80    
(2.91) 
3.78*    
(1.42) 
         
Science class -4.92    (5.91) 
-3.32     
(2.63) 
7.95‡    
(4.31) 
-5.34    
(3.64) 
4.42   
(6.45) 
-2.35    
(4.03) 
-1.34    
(3.10) 
2.65    
(1.79) 
Upper segment         
Math class .24    (2.91) 
2.69    
(2.04) 
3.44    
(2.10) 
1.47     
(3.23) 
4.36*    
(1.50) 
-2.07†    
(.78) 
4.73*    
(1.45) 
1.55*    
(.64) 
         
Science class 4.70
†    
(2.16) 
2.86†     
(1.27) 
-.87    
(1.68) 
1.28    
(2.48) 
-1.27*     
(.45) 
-1.13*    
(.31) 
5.19*    
(1.79) 
.57 
(.39) 
Mean Math class  25.35 22.41 24.67 26.09 20.86 21.65 26.67 23.95 
Mean Science class 25.52 22.14 24.42 26.54 21.63 23.74 26.23 24.32 
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. 
Separate least-squares regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dependent variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for all student-background variables reported in 
Table 2, for all other resource variables reported in Table 4, and for all institutional variables reported in Table 5. 
Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 8: The Coefficient on Class Size in Different Models 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Math class        
Least squares 2.23
† 
(.94) 
.48 
(.39) 
.44 
(.60) 
.22 
(.51) 
1.64*     
(.53) 
-.36 
(.32) 
1.38*    
(.48) 
School fixed effects -.98 (.62) 
.06 
(.46) 
-.08     
(.63) 
.06 
(.43) 
1.69*   
(.64) 
-1.00*   
(.29) 
1.65*   
(.33) 
SFE + IV .89     (1.63)  
.74    
(1.19)    
-.48    
(4.19) 
Science class        
Least squares 1.25
‡     
(.69) 
.25 
(.35) 
-.51 
(.55) 
.86 
(.67) 
-.19 
(.44) 
-.43‡     
(.26) 
.69 
(.69) 
School fixed effects .05 (.61) 
.04 
(.48) 
-.50 
(.64) 
.84 
(.52) 
-.12 
(.38) 
.29 
(.25) 
.65‡ 
(.37) 
SFE + IV -.38   (1.29)  
-.20   
(1.14)    
-.15   
(1.79) 
Students LS / SFE 6672/6659 5978/5962 5606/5576 7101 5056 4976/4917 7471/7462 
Schools  LS / SFE 150/149 150/149 122/121 145 145 143/141 163/162 
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡ 10 percent. 
Separate regressions within each country and subject, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. Dependent 
variable: TIMSS math/science test score. Controlling for all student-background variables reported in Table 2. 
Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 9: Educational Production in Eastern and Western Europe  
 East  First  Second West   East  First Second West 
Student and family 
characteristics     
 Institutional 
setting     
Upper Grade 58.36
*  
(1.71) 
66.05*  
(2.31) 
49.78*   
(2.49) 
55.72*  
(2.14) 
 School 
responsibilities     
Age -22.52
*  
(1.03) 
-28.25*  
(1.39) 
-16.22*  
(1.49) 
-20.75* 
(1.31) 
   Autonomy 
(budget, suppl., t.) 
1.71    
(1.85) 
5.25†   
(2.26) 
-3.06   
(2.75) 
3.17   
(3.65) 
Female -5.22
*   
(1.00) 
-8.07*   
(1.34) 
-1.83    
(1.49) 
-9.89*  
(1.47) 
   Determining 
teacher salary 
1.35    
(2.55) 
3.79    
(3.21) 
-5.00   
(4.03) 
-5.21  
(4.53) 
Immigrant 5.71
‡   
(3.16) 
-2.46   
(3.00) 
10.15†   
(4.66) 
-25.63* 
(3.20) 
 Strong influence 
on curriculum     
Living with both 
parents 
.75    
(1.45) 
6.29*   
(1.91) 
-1.08    
(1.91) 
5.44*   
(1.57) 
   Teachers 
individually 
4.48‡   
(2.51) 
5.17    
(3.82) 
3.75    
(3.27) 
3.77   
(4.20) 
Parents' education        Teachers collectively 
-1.61   
(3.01) 
-2.26   
(4.41) 
-.07    
(3.65) 
-14.05* 
(3.57) 
  Finished 
Secondary 
11.07*  
(1.76) 
17.79*  
(1.79) 
-.25    
(3.30) 
9.10*   
(2.23) 
 Math class teacher 
has strong influence      
  Finished 
University 
37.80*  
(2.10) 
45.04*  
(2.44) 
24.15*   
(3.73) 
28.91*  
(2.90) 
   Money for suppl. 
or subject matter 
2.55    
(2.83) 
3.72    
(3.37) 
-.59    
(5.28) 
-.33   
(2.82) 
Books at home 16.68
*  
(.67) 
20.72*  
(.78) 
13.62*   
(.95) 
14.93*  
(.68) 
   Kind of supplies 
or textbooks 
3.51    
(2.27) 
2.60    
(2.70) 
6.93‡   
(3.96) 
.98    
(2.50) 
Close to the center  3.59    (2.20) 
2.64    
(2.86) 
6.81†    
(3.24) 
3.84    
(3.33) 
 Homework 2.25
†   
(.99) 
3.71‡   
(1.95) 
1.05    
(1.09) 
8.18*  
(1.85) 
Resources and 
teacher 
characteristics 
    
 Uninterested 
parents limit 
teaching 
-4.09‡   
(2.43) 
-5.02   
(3.55) 
-2.72   
(3.22) 
-21.00* 
(5.51) 
Math Class size .80
*    
(.20) 
.68†    
(.28) 
.81*    
(.27) 
1.62*   
(.37) 
 Intercept 598.19
*  
(18.26) 
706.45*  
(24.20) 
546.48   
(26.57) 
664.74* 
(23.70) 
Great shortage of 
materials 
-2.19   
(2.55) 
.58    
(3.17) 
-3.11    
(3.60) 
3.85   
(3.45) 
      
Math Teacher char. 
and  education     
 Students 42,815 25,357 17,458 21,933 
  Teacher is female .69    (2.73) 
-2.07   
(3.24) 
5.36    
(4.50) 
-4.83‡  
(2.69) 
 Schools 1,017 567 450 553 
  Teacher's exper.  
    in ln 
5.04*   
(1.47) 
4.21†   
(1.95) 
5.43†    
(2.26) 
2.76    
(2.04) 
      
  BA or equivalent 1.59    (3.97) 
-6.86   
(5.39) 
5.12    
(4.94) 
-3.47   
(4.81) 
 Mean math score 500.97  (93.61) 
527.09  
(91.93) 
466.14  
(84.00) 
505.10 
(86.34) 
  MA/Ph.D. 4.37   (6.00) 
14.46   
(9.11) 
4.97    
(7.68) 
-4.91   
(5.86) 
      
Significance levels (based on robust standard errors): * 1 percent, † 5 percent, ‡10 percent. 
Separate least-squares regressions within each country group, weighted by students’ sampling probabilities. 
Dependent variable: TIMSS math test score. Clustering-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  Participation of Students, Classes and Schools in TIMSS 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Students 6672 5978 5606 7101 5056 4976 7471 
Classes 299 299 243 290 292 284 325 
Schools 150 150 122 145 145 143 163 
Sampled students (in 
percent)a 0.6% 0.4% 3.0% 0.9% 1.0% 1.7% 0.3% 
a Number of sampled students over the number of children of compulsory school age in percent.  
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Table A2  Definition of Variables and Range of Values  
Variable Name Definition Type Min Max 
Math Score International Math Test Score Numeric 141.6 887.44 
Science Score International Science Test Score Numeric 85.02 872.46 
Student and family 
characteristics     
Upper Grade Grade level of students Dummy 0 for 7th grade 1 for 8th grade 
Age Age of students Numeric 10.1 20.4 
Female Sex of students Dummy 0 for male 1 for female 
Immigrant Origin of students Dummy 0 for other students 1 for immigrated student or parent 
Living with both parents Student’s family situation Dummy 0 for one or no parent 1 for both parents 
Parents' education     
  No or some secondary Dummy Ref. Ref. 
  Finished Secondary Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for finished sec.and some after 
  Finished University 
Highest educational level 
reached by a parent 
Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for finished univ. 
Books at home     
In ln Number of books at student’s home in ln categorical 1.61 5.52 
Community location     
  Non-urban area Dummy Ref. Ref. 
  Close to the center of a 
town 
Location of the student’s 
community Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for close to center 
Resources and teacher 
characteristics     
Class size Size of student’s class Numeric 3 58 
No or some shortage of 
materials Dummy Ref. Ref. 
Great shortage of 
materials 
Degree of school’s shortage 
of materials 
Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for great shortage 
Teacher characteristics     
  Teacher is female Class teacher’s sex Dummy 0 for male 1 for female 
  Teacher's exp. in ln Years of class teacher’s experience in ln Numeric 0 3.91 
Teacher's education     
    Secondary and less Dummy Ref. Ref. 
    BA or equivalent Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for Bachelor/equ. 
    MA/Ph.D. 
Highest educational level 
of class teacher 
Dummy 0 for ref. 1 for Master/equ. 
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Table A2  Definition of Variables and Range of Values (continued) 
Variable Name Definition Type Min. Max. 
Institutional setting     
School responsibilities     
Autonomy (budget, 
supplies, teachers) 
Degree of school’s 
autonomy Categorical 
0 for autonomy in 
no field 
3 for autonomy in 
all three fields 
Determining teacher 
salary 
School’s responsibility 
over setting salaries Dummy 0 for no resp. 
1 for resp. over 
salary 
Strong influence on 
curriculum     
Teachers individually Influence of individual or subject teachers on curr. Dummy 0 for no infl. 
1 for infl. of at least 
one group 
Teachers collectively Infl. of teachers collect. or teacher unions on curr. Dummy 0 for no infl. 
1 for infl. of at least 
one group 
Class teacher has strong 
influence on      
Money for supplies or 
subject matter 
Strong infl. of class 
teachers Dummy 0 for no strong infl. 
1 for strong infl. on 
at least one field 
Kind of supplies or 
textbooks 
Strong infl. of class 
teachers Dummy 0 for no strong infl. 
1 for strong infl. on 
at least one field 
Additional      
Homework Homework for subject in hours per week Numeric 1 9.6 
Uninterested parents 
limit teaching 
Teacher notices 
uncooperative parents 
negatively 
Dummy 0 for no negative infl. on students 
1 for negative infl. 
on students 
Min. and max. values include all seven Eastern European countries. 
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Table A3  Means and Standard Deviations of the Data 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Math Score 543.57   (93.70) 
519.05   
(93.52) 
518.68   
(87.43) 
527.08   
(90.73) 
453.72   
(81.60) 
476.68   
(80.82) 
468.01   
(87.81) 
Science Score 553.44  (86.90) 
535.30   
(92.48) 
544.42   
(88.11) 
526.69   
(90.16) 
441.27   
(88.26) 
458.59   
(83.35) 
468.85   
(102.33) 
Student and family 
characteristics        
Upper Grade .50 (.50) 
.49 
(.50) 
.48 
(.50) 
.49 
(.50) 
.52 
(.50) 
.47 
(.50) 
.50 
(.50) 
Age 13.89   (.65) 
13.82   
(.71) 
14.27   
(.63) 
13.77   
(.62) 
13.84   
(.66) 
13.77   
(.72) 
14.12   
(.71) 
Female .50 (.50) 
.50 
(.50) 
.51 
(.50) 
.51 
(.50) 
.52 
(.50) 
.52 
(.50) 
.51 
(.50) 
Immigrant .02 (.14) 
.02 
(.16) 
.11 
(.32) 
.02 
(.14) 
.02 
(.15) 
.02 
(.14) 
.13 
(.34) 
Living with both parents .89 (.32) 
.92 
(.27) 
.90 
(.30) 
.83 
(.37) 
.85 
(.36) 
.80 
(.40) 
.74 
(.44) 
Parents' education        
  Finished Secondary .55 (.50) 
.72 
(.45) 
.64 
(.48) 
.58 
(.49) 
.56 
(.50) 
.61 
(.49) 
.57 
(.50) 
  Finished University .21 (.41) 
.19 
(.39) 
.19 
(.39) 
.22 
(.41) 
.37 
(.48) 
.29 
(.45) 
.09 
(.29) 
Books at home        
  In ln 4.79 (.73) 
4.73 
(.99) 
4.34 
(.97) 
4.41 
(.87) 
4.31   
(1.04) 
5.03 
(.75) 
3.66   
(1.46) 
Community location        
  Close to the center of a 
town 
.40 
(.49) 
.45 
(.50) 
.38 
(.48) 
.29 
(.45) 
.61 
(.49) 
.30 
(.46) 
.51 
(.50) 
Resources and teacher 
characteristics        
Math Class size 25.35   (3.36) 
22.41   
(5.19) 
24.66   
(3.70) 
26.09   
(4.32) 
20.86   
(3.93) 
21.65   
(6.75) 
26.67   
(6.46) 
Science Class size 25.52   (3.41) 
22.14   
(4.98) 
24.42     
(3.47) 
26.54   
(3.48) 
21.63  
(5.39) 
23.75  
(7.80) 
26.23   
(6.49) 
Great shortage of 
materials 
.03 
(.18) 
.17 
(.38) 
.20 
(.40) 
.02 
(.14) 
.22 
(.42) 
.63 
(.48) 
.17 
(.37) 
Math Teacher 
characteristics        
  Teacher is female .84 (.36) 
.85 
(.36) 
.88 
(.32) 
.79 
(.41) 
.85 
(.35) 
.94 
(.25) 
.67 
(.47) 
  Teacher's exp. in ln 2.82 (.83) 
2.69 
(.75) 
2.63 
(.56) 
2.86 
(.64) 
2.79 
(.70) 
2.65 
(.73) 
2.84 
(.74) 
Math Teacher's 
education        
    BA or equivalent 0 (0) 
.09 
(.29) 
.05 
(.22) 
0 
(0) 
.81 
(.39) 
.93 
(.25) 
.45 
(.50) 
    MA/Ph.D. .99 (.11) 
.02 
(.15) 
0 
(0) 
.99 
(.08) 
.16 
(.36) 
.02 
(.14) 
.00 
(.07) 
        
 39 
Table A3  Means and Standard Deviations of the Data (continued) 
 CSK HUN SVN SLV LTU LVA ROM 
Science Teacher 
characteristics        
  Teacher is female .77 (.42) 
.78 
(.42) 
.82 
(.38) 
.66 
(.47) 
.85 
(.36) 
.83 
(.38) 
.77 
(.42) 
  Teacher's exp. in ln 2.75 (.95) 
2.69 
(.81) 
2.63 
(.70) 
2.69 
(.81) 
2.72 
(.84) 
2.61 
(.88) 
2.77     
(.81) 
Science Teacher's 
education        
    BA or equivalent 0 (0) 
.21 
(.41) 
.14 
(.34) 
0 
(0) 
.72 
(.45) 
.88 
(.32) 
.54 
(.50) 
    MA/Ph.D. .96 (.19) 
.01 
(.08) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
.22 
(.42) 
.03 
(.16) 
.01 
(.08) 
Institutional setting        
School responsibilities        
  Autonomy (budget, 
supplies, teachers) 
2.59 
(.66) 
2.92 
(.30) 
2.98 
(.13) 
2.40 
(.80) 
2.79 
(.44) 
2.85 
(.39) 
1.51     
(.86) 
  Determining teacher 
salary 
.59 
(.49) 
.88 
(.33) 
.29 
(.45) 
.85 
(.36) 
.15 
(.36) 
.75 
(.44) 
.07 
(.25) 
Strong influence on 
curriculum        
  Teachers individually .83 (.37) 
.79 
(.41) 
.24 
(.42) 
.16 
(.37) 
.50 
(.50) 
.44 
(.50) 
.08 
(.27) 
  Teachers collectively .66 (.47) 
.54 
(.50) 
.15 
(.36) 
.10 
(.30) 
.24 
(.43) 
.56 
(.50) 
.04 
(.20) 
Math class teacher has 
strong influence on         
  Money for supplies or 
subject matter 
.13 
(.33) 
.77 
(.42) 
.12 
(.33) 
.19 
(.39) 
.04 
(.20) 
.12 
(.33) 
.17 
(.37) 
  Kind of supplies or 
textbooks 
.42 
(.49) 
.22 
(.41) 
.34 
(.47) 
.16 
(.37) 
.07 
(.26) 
.23 
(.42) 
.18 
(.38) 
Science teacher has 
strong influence on         
  Money for supplies or 
subject matter 
.16 
(.37) 
.71 
(.46) 
.17 
(.38) 
.27 
(.44) 
.14 
(.35) 
.26 
(.44) 
.21 
(.40) 
  Kind of supplies or 
textbooks 
.50 
(.50) 
.29 
(.45) 
.50 
(.50) 
.22 
(.41) 
.13 
(.34) 
.26 
(.44) 
.17 
(.37) 
Additional Math        
Homework 0.58 (0.43) 
1.36 
(.51) 
1.89 
(.93) 
1.18 
(.71) 
2.06 
(.90) 
1.87 
(.74) 
4.52 
(1.83) 
Uninterested parents 
limit teaching 
.07 
(.26) 
.08 
(.27) 
.18 
(.38) 
.11 
(.31) 
.09 
(.28) 
.17 
(.38) 
.50 
(.50) 
Additional Science        
Homework .16 (.18) 
.77 
(.65) 
.28 
(.25) 
.27 
(.20) 
.63 
(.58) 
.59 
(.53) 
.76 
(.95) 
Uninterested parents 
limit teaching 
.06 
(.23) 
.10 
(.30) 
.17 
(.38) 
.08 
(.28) 
.06 
(.24) 
.09 
(.28) 
.37 
(.48) 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
Values are weighted by the sampling probability of the students.  
 
